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APPEARANCES CAN DECEIVE YOU:               
A COGNITIVE ANALYSIS OF THE “SUBJECT BE 
ADJECTIVE TO LOOK AT” CONSTRUCTION* 
1 INTRODUCTION 
This brief paper is concerned with sentences such as (1): 
(1)  Mary is pretty to look at. 
In previous studies, this exact sentence (or its similar variants) has been cited as a 
typical example of the pretty construction (Asakawa and Miyakoshi 1996; Lasnik and 
Fiengo 1974; Kono 1984; Schachter 1981, etc.).
1
 The label “pretty construction”, by 
definition, refers to the set of sentences in which the main predicate (pretty) is 
followed by a retrospective infinitive (to look at), but which does not have a 
pleonastic counterpart (*It is pretty to look at Mary).
2
 The latter feature distinguishes 
the pretty construction from the tough construction, which has a pleonastic 
counterpart. These two characteristics of the pretty construction have been attributed 
to the meaning of the adjective as the main predicate. It has thus been common to list 
a set of adjectives that can be attested in the pretty construction (Ando 2005; 
Huddleston and Pullum 2002; Yasui et. al 1976; etc.). 
The present study, however, will be conducted from an entirely different 
perspective. It builds upon the theoretical assumptions in a school of construction 
grammar (as advanced in Croft 2001; Goldberg 1995, 2006; Langacker 1988, 2000; 
Tomasello 2003, inter alia), whereby “constructions” (or “constructional schemas”) 
are treated as basic linguistic units. One notable assumption in this paradigm is: for a 
linguistic unit to be a construction (i.e. a unit actually utilized in the knowledge of 
language users), there is no a priori restriction on the specificity or complexity of it. 
                                                           
* This is a slightly revised version of Minami (2011). I am grateful to Peter Carter for his patient and 
encouraging help as an informant as well as a proofreader. All remaining errors and inadequacies are, of 
course, mine. 
1 Bolinger (1961: 372) also cites an example of this sort (She’s homely to look at), although the label 
“pretty construction” is not mentioned. 
2 About the “retrospective infinitive”, see Jespersen (1940: 221).  
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Instead, it is high degree of entrenchment, high productivity, and semantic 
idiosyncrasy that contribute to the status of a unit as a construction. I will henceforth 
call this theory Usage-based Construction Grammar (UCG), combining Langacker’s 
(1988, 2000) usage-based model of language with construction grammar. 
This study diverges from the previous studies in three ways. Firstly, it adopts a 
different view on what counts as a constructional schema instantiated by examples as 
(1). From the viewpoint of UCG, either of the two choices has been taken in the 
literature: (i) a fairly abstract schema as represented in (2)a where no item is 
specified; or (ii) a partially specified schema as in (2)b, where the “Adj” slot is filled 
with a specific lexical item (Ando 2005; Asakawa and Miyakoshi 1996; Quirk et al. 
1985; Schachter 1981, etc.). In contrast, it is assumed in this study that (3), where the 
“verb” in the infinitival complement rather than the “adjective” is specified, is better 
qualified as a construction than (2)b (and (2)a), since the former is more productive 
than the latter (Minami 2009: Chapter 6). The constructional schema (3) will be 
henceforth called the SBAL for convenience. 
(2) a. [Subji be Adj to inf ∅i]
3
 
 b. [Subji be pretty to inf ∅i]  
(3)  [Subji be Adj to look at∅i] (=SBAL) 
Secondly, to make clear the properties peculiar to the SBAL, it will be compared 
with another construction exemplified by (4). This sentence is normally considered an 
instance of the constructional schema given in (5), which is sometimes dubbed the 
Copulative-Perception-Verb (=CPV) Construction (Taniguchi 1997). 
(4)  Mary looks pretty. 
(5) [Subj Verb (=a copulative perception verb) Adj] 
Again, just as has been shown above with the pretty construction, the constructional 
schema assumed in the present study is (6), whereby the “Verb” slot is filled with look. 
This schema will be called the SLA from now onward. 
(6) [Subj look Adj] (=SLA) 
It is thus assumed in the present study that the SBAL and the SLA constitute two 
grammatical constructions having the perception verb look in common. Despite some 
semantic overlaps, they are different in many respects. This is predictable from the 
well-known hypothesis that “a difference in syntactic form always spells a difference 
in meaning” (Bolinger 1968: 127). However, the SBAL and the SLA are similar 
enough to be worth comparing, as we shall see in the following sections. Moreover, 
                                                           
3 Abbreviations and signs for the schematic representations of constructions: Subj = Subject, Adj = 
Adjective, inf = infinitive, ∅ = formal gap, i = index indicating identical reference.  
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the comparison reveals how several aspects of our views on visual information 
motivate the two constructions. 
Finally, the present study takes a wider view on the “constructional meaning” than 
previous studies. Going beyond the sentential-level meaning (or “propositional 
meaning”) it will investigate contextual patterns (or usage patterns) of a construction.
4
  
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a cognitive and functional 
comparison of the SBAL with the SLA. In section 3, our cognitive models for visual 
information will be proposed, and it will then be shown that the observations in 
section 2 can be accounted for with the proposed models. Section 4 summarizes this 
paper, referring to the implications the present study has for future research on 
perception verbs and the pretty construction. 
2 NATURE OF THE SBAL IN COMPARISON WITH THE SLA 
Despite certain semantic/conceptual overlaps between the SBAL and the SLA, several 
noteworthy differences can be found. In this section, we will first compare the two 
constructions in terms of what each construction itself means (2.1). We will then go 
beyond the sentence-level to illustrate that the SBAL tends to be used in specific 
patterns of context where the SLA is not used as frequently (2.2). 
2.1 Sentential-level difference 
A notable semantic difference between the SBAL and the SLA emerges when the 
same adjective receives different interpretations in these constructions. The pair in (7) 
constitutes a good example: 
(7) a.  The book looks easy. (instance of SLA) 
 b. ? The book is easy to look at.
5
 (instance of SBAL) 
In (7)a, the adjective easy mainly designates the property of “low difficulty” to be 
experienced in the process of reading the book. The verb look indicates that the 
property described is inferred by the speaker. Easy in (7)b, on the other hand, cannot 
be interpreted this way. Instead it means a positive quality of the book’s appearance. A 
question mark is attached to this sentence since it is extremely difficult to envisage a 
context where this sentence would be actually used. In fact, in (7)b, with a particular 
“book” in the subject position, the “low difficulty” sense is excluded due to the 
                                                           
4 An extensive discussion on the importance of having a global view on constructional meaning can be 
found in Yamanashi (2009: Chapter 6). 
5 In this paper, “?” will be used to indicate semantic anomaly, and “#” will be attached when the 
sequence in question is pragmatically infelicitous. 
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constructional meaning of the SBAL. The SBAL is used to describe properties 
perceivable via visual perception only. The difficulty entailed in the process of 
book-reading cannot be directly accessed through visual perception; it requires an 
inference on the part of the speaker. (7)b can thus never be interpreted in the same 
manner as (7)a. 
From the observation above it follows that the adjective of the SBAL must refer to 
a property directly accessible to visual perception, while that of the SLA is free from 
such a restriction mainly because the construction has developed an inferential 
meaning (see Taniguchi 1997; Dixon 2005: 204-5; Gisborne 2010: Chapter 7, etc.). At 




(8) a.  SLA = evaluative description of a property based on visual 
perception and/or the speaker’s inference 
 b.  SLA = evaluative description of a property based only on visual 
perception 
The primary difference of the SBAL from the SLA, therefore, is that the former lacks 
the speaker’s inference part of the property-description. 
The next section will present a more “pragmatic” comparison of the SBAL and the 
SLA and show that the observed differences are due to the semantic difference 
delineated in (8). 
2.2 Differences beyond the sentential level 
It needs to be noted first that the SBAL conveys an implication that the SLA lacks. 
The SBAL, unlike the SLA, strongly implicates that the entity designated by the 
subject has other properties than the one described by the adjective and that such 
properties are not to be perceived through visual perception but other means. Let us 
take an example to see this: 
(9) a.  That looks good.  
   [“As a purchase, the item has potential”] 
 b.  That’s good to look at. 
   [“Despite its appearance, as a purchase the item has drawbacks”] 
A speaker employing (9)a would appear to be suggesting that the item suits the needs 
of either the speaker or listener in some way. In contrast, use of (9)b implies that 
either the speaker is not considering making the purchase, or that the hearer should 
                                                           
6 Gisborne (2010: Chapter 7) extensively argues that the SLA (a SOUND-class verb, in his terminology) 
is associated with evidentiality and epistemic modality. 
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exercise caution in doing so. It is likely in the case of (9)b that the speaker will 
introduce reasons for the item’s limited desirability. This suggests that the SBAL is 
more context-dependent than the SLA. In what follows it will be shown that this is the 
case. 
2.2.1 Usage patterns peculiar to the SBAL     The implication of the SBAL 
manifests itself in linguistic expressions. Through my survey of the British National 
Corpus (BNC), two characteristic patterns were found. Some examples of the first 
pattern are given in (10): 
(10) a.  Terracotta tiles, brick, flagstone, slate, terrazzo and non-slip 




 b.  The buildings and the greens were well laid-out, modern in style 
and agreeable to look at. (BNC) 
 c.  As a Member of The Folio Society, you can build up a collection 
of superb books that are marvellous to read, beautiful to look at, 
and available only to Members. (BNC) 
In these, the subject is followed by multiple predicates, among which is the SBAL 
predicate (i.e. “Adj to look at”). More than one predicate is “aligned”, so to say, to 
give a detailed evaluation of the subject entity. In (10)b, for instance, the three 
predicates (well laid-out, modern in style, and agreeable to look at) all contribute to 
forming a positive evaluation of the subject entity. Henceforth, this pattern will be 
called the “alignment pattern”.  
The second pattern is exemplified by (11): 
(11) a.  And though the cottage was pretty to look at, it was rather poky 
inside with small, dark rooms and low ceilings. (BNC) 
 b.  It may be plain to look at, but the service is great, and the prices 
reasonable. (BNC) 
 c.  She had wanted to go on the stage; acting had always been her 
forte, and although she might be insignificant to look at, she had a 
beautiful voice and perfect diction. (BNC) 
Again, a particular entity is described with more than one predicate, one of which is 
the SBAL predicate. Unlike the first pattern we just saw above, however, the property 
denoted by the SBAL predicate is contrasted with others in terms of evaluative 
judgment about the subject entity. In (11)c, for example, the SBAL predicate 
(insignificant to look at) is connected with a negative evaluation of the subject entity 
(= “she”), whereas the others (have a beautiful voice and have perfect diction) are 
associated with a positive evaluation of it. Henceforth this pattern will be termed the 
                                                           




It is clear that the two patterns are related to each other. What is shared is the 
understanding that the described entity has multiple properties and the property 
denoted by the “Adj to look at” part is counted as just one of them. It is thus natural 
that there are examples like (12), which are hard to categorize sharply into either of 
the two patterns. We will turn back to examples of this sort in 3.2.2. 
(12)  Polly watched him. Tall, broad-shouldered, with lean hips and muscular 
legs, he was magnificent to look at. He was also formidable, demanding, 
difficult --; and smouldering with anger, but she still found it impossible 
to tear her gaze away. (BNC) 
2.2.2 Further comparison     One might argue against the claim that the contrasting 
pattern is peculiar to the SBAL by pointing out the fact that the SLA, at least in some 
cases, can also be used in similar contexts, as in (13): 
(13) a.  The book looked interesting, but it wasn’t. 
 b.  “A witty limerick is very hard to write,” she added. “They look 
easy but they most certainly are not.” (BNC) 
 c.  An NPV result of £100,000 may look attractive. If the investment 
involved is £100 million, however, it is not so good. (BNC) 
None of the examples in (13), however, falls into the contrasting pattern. In these 
examples, the property described by the SLA adjective is not contrasted with other 
properties attributed to the subject entity. Rather, it is different “judgments” about a 
particular property of the subject entity that are contrasted. In (13)a, for example, two 
different modes of judgment about the “interestingness” of the book are contrasted; 
the first based on the speaker’s inference at some point and the second based on more 
solid evidence (i.e. the reality). As we have seen in 2.1, the SLA is associated with the 
speaker’s inference on a particular property pertaining to the subject entity. Since it is 
an inference as shown in (14), its content can be either supported or denied by the 
perception of the reality (see Gisborne 2010: Chapter 7). 
(14) a.  He looks vicious, and he is. 
 b.  He looks vicious, but he isn’t/he’s very gentle. 
Instances like (14), which stem from this feature of the SLA, need to be distinguished 
from the contrasting pattern as delineated in 2.2.1. Firstly, the SBAL does not exhibit 
this feature: 
(15) a. # The book was interesting to look at, and it was. 
 b. # The book was interesting to look at, but it wasn’t. 
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Sentences in (15) do not make good sense: (15)a results in redundancy since the latter 
clause simply repeats the predicate in the preceding SBAL sentence; in (15)b, the 
clause following but does not deny the speaker’s judgment about the interestingness 
of the book in question, but it cancels the whole predicate (interesting to look at), 
resulting in a contradiction. In point of fact, unlike look in the SLA, to look at in the 
SBAL does not have an inferential meaning, but it restricts the source of information 
to visual perception. Essentially, the SBAL is used to state that the property described 
by the adjective is perceived strictly through visual perception and not by any other 
means. It is this exclusive nature that makes it easy for the SBAL to be used in the 
property-contrasting pattern. Hence, the SBAL can make sense in the but-format as in 
(15)b if the latter clause indicates the existence of other properties of the subject 
entity that are not directly accessible to visual perception, as shown in (16).  
(16)  The book was interesting to look at, but its content was horrible. 
It is worth noting here that there are some cases where the observed distinction 
apparently disappears, for example, when the meaning of the adjective is 
visually-oriented, the observed difference between the SLA and the SBAL is reduced. 
(17) a. # Mary looks pretty, but she isn’t. 
 b. # Mary looks pretty, but she isn’t. 
The adjective pretty, especially when it accompanies a human subject, is essentially 
related to visual perception; it exclusively modifies the appearance of the subject 
entity. In such a case, the meaning of the SLA is closest to that of the SBAL.
8
 Still, as 
discussed above, the SBAL by itself implies that the subject entity has other 
properties than the one it describes, which are to be perceived via other means than 
visual perception. The SLA does not have this implication, even if the meaning of its 
adjective is strictly visual in nature.
9
 
On the other hand, when the semantic content of the adjective is less specific, it 
appears that both of the two constructions equally join the property-contrasting 
pattern. 
(18) a.  The cake looks nice, but it’s revolting.  
    (Gisborne and Holmes 2007: 5) 
 b.  The cake is nice to look at, but it’s revolting. 
                                                           
8 Gisborne (2010) names examples like (17) “attributionary constructions” to distinguish it from other, 
inference-based cases. In the present study, however, this is not a crucial distinction, as shall be argued 
later. 
9 Peter Carter (personal communication) points out that one can let a SLA sentence have this kind of 
implication by putting a stress on the verb look (e.g. Mary LOOKS pretty.). This fact supports my position 
that the SLA as it is does not have the implication, since the SBAL does not require such a device to 
embrace this implication. 
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However, a subtle but significant difference can be observed between (18)a and (18)b. 
In the former, the SLA can indicate the speaker’s inference about the “niceness as a 
cake” (including its taste, etc.) as well as the cake’s nice appearance. In the latter, by 
contrast, the meaning of the SBAL is restricted to the appearance of the cake. In this 
respect, (18)a does not constitute a good example of the property-contrasting pattern 
while (18)b does. 
3 COGNITIVE DESCRIPTIONS OF THE SBAL AND THE SLA 
Thus far, we have observed how the two constructions under discussion have different 
semantic and pragmatic functions. In this section, we will seek a cognitive account of 
the observed phenomena. In 3.1., I will propose that we have three Idealized 
Cognitive Models (=ICMs) (Lakoff 1987: Chapter 4) for the concept of visual 
information, which constitute a cluster model. 3.2. will attempt to delineate how the 
proposed model motivates the SLA and the SBAL, looking at further attested pieces 
of evidence from BNC. 
3.1 ICMs for visual information 
There is an ambivalence toward visual perception as a source of information. On the 
one hand, we tend to rely very much on it, since it usually gives us a larger amount of 
information than other sources. In this respect, visual perception enjoys a privileged 
status over the other types of perception. It is also the case, on the other hand, that the 
information gained through visual perception is mostly partial and incomplete in 
nature. This is why some other sources of information besides visual perception are 
often required to get access to the essential property of things in question. From this I 
assume that these attitudes constitute two distinct cognitive models we have for 
information through visual perception (simply “visual information”, henceforth). I 
will call them the Precedence/Reliability model and the Partiality model, respectively. 
Their brief descriptions are given in (19). 
(19) a.  visual information is the most accessible and the most reliable 
source of information [Precedence/Reliability model] 
 b.  visual information is part of the whole source of information 
available  [Partiality model] 
These models are ICMs in that each model is abstracted away from certain aspects of 
reality in which they do not hold true. Under the Precedence/Reliability model (the 
PR model, hereafter), the cases where the visual information is not available (in the 
darkness, for example) are precluded. The Partiality model, by contrast, excludes the 
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situations where only visual information matters or is available after all. Thus, the two 
models are complementary to each other; both are based upon our actual knowledge 
about visual information, but they differ in which part of it is highlighted. The PR 
model highlights the clear advantage of visual information, back-grounding the fact 
that there are a lot of properties that cannot be accessed through visual perception. By 
contrast, the Partiality model highlights the fact that things have a set of properties, 
only part of which can be accessed via visual perception, back-grounding its 
precedence over the other sources of information. In addition to the two above, there 
is another, crucial model as described in (20): 
(20)  visual information is deceptive [Deception] 
Considering the proverb “appearances can be deceptive”, few would dispute that this 
model is deep-rooted in our understanding of visual information. This model should 
be treated separately from the other two in that it is contingent upon them. The 
content of the Deception model varies depending on which of the two other models it 
is connected with. When it is related to the PR model, visual information is deceptive 
in the way it does not provide a correct understanding of a particular aspect of the 
entity in question. When it is related to the Partiality model, visual information 
deceives in the way it does not capture the real value of the entity in question. Either 
way, the Deception model is also idealized since in reality there are cases where 
visual information does not deceive because it provides correct, necessary, and 
sufficient information about the targeted entity. The relationships between the three 
models are diagrammed in Figure 1. The PR and the Partiality models are in a 
complementary relation, and the arrows connecting the two models with the 
Deception model stand for dependency relations; the Deception model depends upon 











3.2 Cognitive account 
To account for the associations between the two constructions and the ICMs, I 







(21) a.  the SLA = the PR model (+ the Deception model) 
 b.  the SBAL = the Partiality model (+ the Deception model) 
In what follows, I will argue for the validity of (21)a and (21)b. 
3.2.1 The SLA     As stated in section 2, the essential function of this construction 
is to give an inference by the speaker about a particular property pertaining to the 
subject entity. Crucially, the degree of certainty with which the expressed inference is 
given varies to some extent. The variation is factored out by the but-format we have 
utilized in 2.2.2. Compare (22) and (23): 
(22) a. # Mary looks pretty, but she isn’t. (=(17)a) 
 b. # The car looks blue, but it isn’t. 
(23) a.  The book looked interesting, but it wasn’t. 
 b.  The sea looks blue, but it isn’t. 
The content of inference described in the SLA instances in (22) cannot be denied, 
since they serve to describe the reality. In this sense, they are trivially inferential. The 
instances in (23), on other hand, the inferred contents can be cancelled as one realizes 
that they mismatch the reality. Thus, these are genuinely inferential expressions. In 
either case, however, what is important to note is that the inferred content displayed 
by any SLA instance is highly expected to be true, since the PR model induces such a 
high expectation about visual information. The expectation is met without failure 
when the property concerned is strictly vision-related, as in (22), but otherwise it can 
fail to be fulfilled, as in (23). The existence of such cases in our experience helps to 
form the Deception model in our mind. 
The argument in the last paragraph is apparently the exact opposite of the one 
found in Gisborne (2010: 260), in which the unreliability of sensory data is pointed 
out and it is contended that such unreliability gives rise to the judging element in the 
senses of copulative perception verbs (including the verb look in the SLA, in the 
present term). Along the line of this argument, one could not capture the fact (noted 
by Gisborne himself) that the “judging element” (inferential meaning, in the present 
term) is available with look and sound but not with feel, smell, and taste. The problem 
is two-fold. Firstly, just referring to the unreliability of sensory data in general does 
not suffice. A discrimination between the five senses by the degree of (un)reliability 
(or precedence) as a source of information is necessary. Secondly, in connection with 
the first point, Gisborne’s argument fails to capture the fact that high reliability is 
conceptually correlated with the possibility of deception; the more something is relied 
upon, the greater the deception when expectations are violated. 
3.2.2 The SBAL     In the conceptualization associated with the SBAL, visual 
information is not treated as the most reliable source for inference. Rather, it is 
assumed that there are many other pieces of information available that vision cannot 
get access to. Hence, the Partiality model, not the PR model, is relevant here. As we 
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have already seen in 2.2.2, the content conveyed by the SBAL predicate cannot be 
denied (=(24)a). Unlike its SLA counterpart as in (23)a, however, the SBAL sentence 
in (24)a does not mean that the content of the book is interesting. It conveys that the 
appearance of the book is interesting, with no inference about the property of 
interestingness per se involved. 
(24) a. # The book was interesting to look at, but it wasn’t. (=(15)b) 
 b.  The book was interesting to look at, but its content was horrible.  
    (=(16)) 
But the SBAL involves inference in a different manner. It is an inference regarding 
the evaluation of the entity targeted (evaluative inference, henceforth). Thus, one 
crucial function of the SBAL is to state an evaluation of the subject entity strictly 
through visual information. Since this evaluation is partially adequate in nature, it is 
possible that approaching the entity including other sources of information than vision 
results in a totally different evaluation from the one based solely on visual 
information. (24)b exemplifies such a situation; the book is evaluated positively by its 
appearance, but this evaluation shifts in the totally opposite direction once one reads it. 
It is where such an evaluative gap obtains that the Deception model comes into play. 
Hence, the SBAL is primarily associated with the Partiality model, and involves the 
Deception model in a different manner from the SLA. 
We have already seen some supporting examples for the present claim in 2.2.1. 
Clearly, the property-alignment pattern is a form of manifestation of the Partiality 
model, while the property-contrasting pattern is that of the Partiality model in 
combination with the Deception model. It should be noted, however, that these two 
patterns do not exhaust the possible linguistic realization of the two models. There are 
cases where the two models interact with each other in a more complex fashion, as 
observed in the examples below: 
(25)  He was so good to look at. But his looks were only a part of it; it was the 
man himself who drew her like a magnet, his mind, his character, his 
spirit, whatever made him him.  (BNC) 
(26)  They were quite convinced that if Jeopardy had not been quite so 
stunning to look at, most people would not like him at all because he 
was arrogant and cold. (BNC) 
(27)  Mary was spectacular to look at and her own knowledge that she was 
made her capricious and difficult, expecting the best of everything.  
    (BNC) 
Example (25) constitutes a fairly straight manifestation of the Partiality model; the 
involvement of the Partiality model is explicitly mentioned just after the SBAL (But 
his looks were only part of it), and then the other positive elements about the man, 
which cannot be directly accessible to vision, are enumerated. The comprehension of 
(26), quite in conformity of the Partiality model, requires a mode of understanding 
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that one’s looks and their other properties (such as character) are separated and 
independent of each other. Interestingly, the Deception model is also concerned with 
(26). What is implied by this sentence is that in reality Jeopardy is not disliked very 
much thanks to his stunning looks. Similarly, (27) is built upon the understanding that 
one’s looks and other properties are separated and that one’s looks can be deceptive in 
that personal appearances sometimes dominate the evaluative inference about the 
entity, concealing the other properties. 
4 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper, from a UCG perspective, I have first presented a comparison of the 
SBAL with the SLA, revealing a number of differences. Then, by organizing ICMs 
for visual information in the light of actual experiences, I have shown that the 
observed differences have particular cognitive foundations. This study has at least two 
implications for future research on perception verbs in general. First, it has opened the 
possibility to count the pretty construction as one of the syntactic forms where 
perception verbs play a central role. Second, for the purpose of fully describing the 
meaning of a construction, especially one of property predication, going beyond the 
sentential level and investigating contextual patterns in which the construction is 
actually used is more important than the previous studies have assumed. 
It goes without saying that look at is not the only perception verb attested in the 
pretty construction. A preliminary search on BNC has revealed that visual verbs other 
than look at such as watch, see, and behold and auditory verbs such as listen to and 
hear are attested in this construction, whereas verbs of the other sensory domains are 
hardly used. Investigating those attested perception verbs and explaining the gap 
between the different sensory domains will be left for future research. 
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